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CASE NOTES

ANTITRUST: MONOPOLIZATION AND ATTEMPT TO
MONOPOLIZE - REASONABLE CONDUCT FOR ONE
WITH MONOPOLY POWER INCLUDES UTILIZATION
OF MARKETING PRACTICES EMPLOYED BY OTHER
COMPETITORS IN MARKET - California Computer
Products,Inc. v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp., 613
F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
Though none have yet succeeded, many companies have
tried to obtain a final judgment against International Business
Machines (IBM) for monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the computer industry.' The constantly evolving technology of the computer industry has made litigation of such
claims particularly difficult. IBM and other general purpose
computer system manufacturers are now marketing fourth
generation computers, in an industry just thirty years old.
This rapid growth has left courts divided on the threshold issue of defining a relevant product market.' Uncertainty as to
the state of the law necessarily imposes hardships on plaintiffs
0 1981 by Manuel Fishman
1. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 481 F. Supp.
965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (judgment for defendant); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (directed verdict for defendant); Telex Corp.
v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.
1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, No.
72-2553 (D. Ariz. July 12, 1972), rev'd and remanded, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1977); MDC Data Centers, Inc. v. IBM, 342 F. Supp. 502
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (summary judgment for defendant); Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 306
F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969) (settled out of court).
2. Compare California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979) (wherein the court assumes that an IBM plug-compatible disc drive and associated controllers constitute a separate sub-market) with Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d
894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (holding that the relevant market
should also include non-IBM plug-compatible peripheral products). The court in ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), found even that
too narrow, holding that the plaintiff had failed to meet its burden of proof of establishing a relevant market because it had excluded alternative storage media (i.e., tape
and memory). Finally, in In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 481
F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), the court rejected plaintiff's proof of relevant market
because it excluded mini and micro computers as well as software supplies.
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who seek to prohibit illegal restraints of trade. This volatility
is harmful, and threatens to frustrate the fundamental objective of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' A recent case, California
Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM,4 indicates the Ninth Circuit
still has not settled basic questions in this area of the law.
California Computer Products, Inc. (CalComp), of
Anaheim, California, was established in 1958. The company is
a subsidiary of Sanders Associates, Inc. of New Hampshire.'
Originally only a manufacturer of computer plotting devices,
the company acquired Century Data Systems in 1969 and entered the disc drive market, manufacturing disc drives and
controllers that were "plug compatible" with IBM computer
mainframes.6
In October 1973, CalComp filed suit against IBM alleging
that various IBM products and marketing practices prevented
it from effectively competing in disc product sales and thus
7
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. CalComp
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The fundamental objective of the Act is "the detection and frustration of all efforts unduly to restrain the free course of interstate commerce." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1932).
4. 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
5.

AMERICAN ELECTRONICS ASS'N, AMERICAN ELECTRONICS Ass'N DIRECTORY 45

(32d ed. 1980).
6. 613 F.2d at 731. While an in-depth review of computer technology is beyond
the scope of this Note, a basic computer system contains three distinct elements; a
central processing unit (CPU), peripheral devices, and a controller. The CPU completes the large majority of data processing work for the system. It is referred to as
the mainframe. Peripheral devices are attached to the CPU and either input information necessary for the CPU to perform its data processing work or output the data
processing on to a printer, plotting device, video terminal, etc. A disc drive is an input
peripheral device through which a computer program is fed into the CPU. The controller unit is the interface between the peripheral and the CPU. In addition to actually connecting the two elements, it performs initial data processing so as to facilitate
the work for the CPU. See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973),
rev'd in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
This litigation concerns peripheral equipment - disc drives - which are plug
compatible with IBM CPU's. In other words, IBM plug compatible manufacturers
(PCM's) build disc drives comparable to IBM disc drives and copy the necessary
interface so that any user can plug their disc drive into an IBM CPU.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared illegal. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,

1981]

COMPUTER PRODUCTS v. IBM

claimed injury to three classes of IBM competitors: 1) general
purpose computer systems manufacturers, 2) leasing compa-

nies, and 3) IBM-compatible peripheral equipment manufacturers. Following three years of discovery and a jury trial lasting fifty-four days in the U.S. District Court for the Central

District of California, IBM was granted a directed verdict.8
The district court held as a matter of law that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, limiting its inquiry to the sufficiency of CalComp's evidence, which the
court reasoned required a showing of "substantial evidence." 9
The court of appeals began its inquiry with CalComp's
standing as a proper party in an antitrust action. The court
ruled CalComp must show both injury causally linked to an
illegal presence in the market and injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.10 To satisfy the first element of the test, the court required "direct causal injury,""
reasoning that even though antitrust violations create many
"foreseeable ripples of injury" the law does not allow all those
affected to sue for damages." To fulfill the second part of the
in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
8. 613 F.2d at 731.
9. Id. at 733-34. The court applied, as its standard of review, the test enunciated in Continental Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 696 n.6 (1961): "[Tlhe appellate court must consider the evidence in its strongest light in favor of the party
against whom the motion for directed verdict was made, and must give him the advantage of every fair and reasonable intendment that the evidence can justify ...
The same rule governs in ruling on motions for directed verdict in treble damage
suits under the antitrust laws." See also Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip. Co. v. Int'l
Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974) wherein
the court discusses the issue of "substantial evidence," noting "substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla."
10. 613 F.2d at 732 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
11. Id.
12. John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 499 (9th Cir.
1977) (indirect ripple effect insufficient to allow claim for damages). The John Lenore
holding has been followed in other circuits; see Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier
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test, the court required a showing that the injury was caused
by a reduction, rather than an increase, in competition. The
court reasoned that the antitrust laws were enacted for the
protection of competition, not competitors. s The court ruled
that CalComp lacked standing to maintain an antitrust action
as to the first two categories of claims. CalComp was not
among these two classes of IBM competitors, nor was there a
direct causal injury that would grant it standing. The court
proceeded to review CalComp's claim as to IBM's alleged anticompetitive effects on IBM-compatible peripheral equipment manufacturers.
The court outlined the prima facie case for section 2 monopolization. This three part test requires: 1) proof of defendant's possession of monopoly power in a relevant market; 2)
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; and 3) causal
antitrust injury. The court conceded that CalComp had
presented sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of
defendant's monopoly power in a relevant market. Monopoly
power is the power to control prices or exclude competition in
a relevant market"' and the existence of such power can be
inferred from predominant market share." Whereas prior
courts, forced to wrestle with the issue of monopolization of
the computer industry, dissected the industry into distinct
"sub-markets," in this case, the issue received short shrift.
The court refused to examine the market evidence; rather, it
noted that the evidence concerning various market definitions
was in conflict and internally inconsistent. "Still, we assume
arguendo that [plug-compatible disc drives] is an appropriately defined market."" The court also minimized the issue of
inferring monopoly power from a showing of predominant
market share. Consequently, it refused to "become enmeshed
in the . . . conflicting and complex evidence on this element"
and assumed that IBM possessed monopoly power.17 The
analysis of this issue is markedly different from the analysis in
Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); Midwest Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group,
596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979); Lupia v. Stella D'oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
13. 613 F.2d at 732 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962)).

14. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
15.
16.
17.

United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
613 F.2d at 738.
Id. at 739.
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prior cases' s where district and circuit courts cited Pacific
Coast Agricultural Export Association v. Sunkist Growers,

Inc. " for the proposition that although market share is an important factor, it alone does not determine the presence of
monopoly power.

The two remaining issues were whether there was sufficient evidence on IBM's alleged monopolizing conduct and
whether plaintiff had sustained causal antitrust injury. The

court reviewed IBM's contested marketing practices. In 1970
the company had introduced two disc drive products, the
2319A and the 2319B. Both were reworked versions of earlier
disc drives, modified to facilitate interface with high speed
CPU's. 20 In introducing these products IBM cut its prices on
the disc drives by thirty percent. One year later IBM indirectly cut its prices in another way through its introduction of
a long-term lease plan

-

the Fixed Term Plan (FTP) -

cov-

ering most peripheral equipment. Disc drive prices were discounted eight percent and sixteen percent, on one and two
year leases. Purchase prices on FTP products were also cut by
fifteen percent.2 '

The court reasoned that IBM had merely responded to its
competitors' lower prices by reducing its own prices to a
point, well above the product's marginal cost, 2 that was still
18. E.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (granting a directed verdict for defendant and holding that regardless of IBM's
market share, evidence indicated defendant lacked power to control prices and exclude competition in a market with a high degree of product innovation and minimal
entry barriers for potential competitors); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559
F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1977) (judgment for defendant reversed, the court holding that evidence other than IBM's predominant share of the
market supported an inference of market dominance; the court cites IBM's market
leverage due to initial concentration of IBM installed computer systems, high customer changeover costs, and superior price management capability).
19. 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
20. See note 5 supra.
21. 613 F.2d at 740-41.
22. Id. at 742. Discussion of economics is inevitable when cost is concerned. A
company has two types of costs: "fixed" and "variable." Examples of fixed costs include management costs, depreciation, and property taxes. Fixed costs do not vary
with output. Even if a company produces only one product unit, fixed costs remain
the same. Examples of variable costs include labor directly related to production, repair and maintenance, royalties, fuel, and utilities.
"Total cost" is the sum of a company's fixed and variable costs. "Marginal cost"
is the increment to total cost that results from producing an additional unit of output. It is solely a function of variable costs. Understandably, marginal cost is lower
when production is down and increases as production approaches plant capacity and
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"substantially profitable" for IBM. Judge Choy termed IBM's
conduct "pro-competitive, '

28

and felt that competition from

peripheral equipment manufacturers (including CalComp)
had provided the stimulus for IBM's price reductions. Since
CalComp's claim for damages arose as a result of these IBM
price reductions, the competitive process had not been restricted and CalComp, therefore, had sustained no compensable injury from conduct which "unnecessarily excluded"
competition.2 '
Thus, the court disposed of the monopolization charge; it
then addressed the alleged violation of a section 2 attempt to
monopolize. The court set forth the necessary elements to
show an illegal attempt to monopolize: 1) a finding of specific
intent to control prices or destroy competition; 2) predatory
or anti-competitive conduct; 3) dangerous probability of success; and 4) causal antitrust injury.
The CalComp interpretation of the plaintiff's prima facie
case for a section 2 attempt to monopolize is highly controversial. Considered separately, each element in the court's test is
based on sound precedent. However, the Ninth Circuit has
adopted a "short cut" method of inferring "dangerous
probability" of actual monopolization from a specific intent to
destroy competition. Since "ordinarily specific intent is difficult to prove,"" the court inferred the requisite intent from a
showing of predatory conduct aimed at accomplishing the unlawful purpose. This inferential analysis permits limited inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence of defendant's
anticompetitive conduct.2 6
This truncated test for attempt to monopolize, first enunciated in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Company,27 has been consistently followed in the Ninth Circuit. It has been criticized
more labor, fuel, and maintenance is needed.
A final term, "average cost" will be discussed in more detail later. Average cost is
the total cost divided by output. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricingand Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 700
(1975).
23. 613 F.2d at 740.
24. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
25. 613 F.2d at 737 (quoting Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d
8, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974)).
26. See Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 854 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
27. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
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both within the Ninth Circuit 28 and by a majority of the
eleven circuit courts of appeals .2 Based on a reading of the
1905 Supreme Court decision in Swift & Co. v. United
States,s0 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's
reference to "dangerous probability" as being a "consequence" of specific intent.31 CalComp takes the "short cut"
rule one step further. Lessig permitted an inference of dangerous probability and specific intent based on independent
proof of a clear section 1 violation (price fixing). 82 In CalComp
there was no allegation of a section 1 violation. Thus, the
CalComp application of the Lessig "short cut" rule broadens
the potential scope of that test. Though the Ninth Circuit has
acknowledged the "substantial criticism"" of the Lessig hold28. See General Communication Eng'r, Inc. v. Motorola Communication and
Elecs., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 274, 284-85 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
29. See Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 276 (5th
Cir. 1978): "Although some others disagree with us, [citing Lessig it is the law of the
Fifth Circuit - with which the majority of our sister circuits around the country
agree - that definition of the relevant market is required in attempt cases as well as
in monopolization cases." Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1348
(3d Cir. 1975): "An essential element of a section two attempt to monopolize violation
is that the actor have a specific intent to monopolize the relevant market. Another
essential element of the offense is that the actor have sufficient market power to come
dangerously close to success." (citations omitted). Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 417 F. Supp. 263, 270 (D.D.C. 1976): "Clearly, one can threaten to monopolize
only that which is capable of being monopolized. Accordingly, contrary to plaintiff's
contention, the relevant market is a basic issue in a case charging an attempt to monopolize." Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Service Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1222, 1230-31
(N.D. Ill.
1976): "This rule [referring to Lessig] has had a shaky history in the Ninth
Circuit and has been widely disapproved by other courts. The rule followed by most
courts is that an attempt to monopolize requires the specific intent to obtain monopoly power in the relevant market and the dangerous probability of success." (citations
omitted). Varney v. Coleman Co., 385 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (D.N.H. 1974): "I disagree
with Lessig. Mr. Justice Holmes intended specific intent and dangerous probability to
be separate elements." Becker v. Safelight Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625, 637 (D.
Kan. 1965): "The Ninth Circuit in Lessig relied on a footnote in United States v. E. I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co .... for its statement that the relevant 'market is not in
issue in an attempt to monopolize case. With all respect, we do not read Du Pont as
justifying such a statement." See also Acme Precision Prod., Inc. v. American Alloys
Corp., 484 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973).
30. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
31. 327 F.2d at 474 n.46.
32. This distinction was reemphasized in later opinions. See Janich Bros. v.
American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829
(1978); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 910 (1977); Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
33. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 814 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
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ing and "short cut" rule, the CalComp decision makes no attempt to retreat from Lessig. It is uncertain to what extent
the Ninth Circuit will continue to press this issue in the face
of the Supreme Court's implicit disapproval of this
formulation."
The Sherman Act deals with the "competitive reality" of
the marketplace.85 Thus, the peculiarities of the relevant market and its competitors becomes extremely important. What is
reasonable for one competitor in one market may be unreasonably restrictive if attempted by a monopolist in the same
market or by another competitor in a different market. As a
rule, conduct lawful for a monopolist is excluded as the basis
for the offense of attempt to monopolize. It would be unfair to
punish a competitor for engaging in conduct which a monopolist could practice with legal impunity. The impact of a defendant's conduct on the competitive process in the market is indicative of the reasonableness of the restraint.
Courts have eschewed too narrow an interpretation of
conduct constituting "willful acquisition or maintenance" of
monopoly power or "predatory, anti-competitive conduct" directed at accomplishing the unlawful purpose. In CalComp,
the court measured these two factual questions against a single standard: whether defendant's acts, otherwise lawful, were
unreasonably restrictive of competition. In upholding the
same IBM marketing and pricing actions which are the subject of the CalComp litigation, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Telex Corp. v. IBMAP took into consideration two
additional factors - "whether or not the acts are ordinary
business practices typical of those used in a competitive market, and secondly whether the acts constitute the use of monopoly power."' 87 With this in mind, CalComp's evidence was

comparatively weak. CalComp's chairman testified that IBM's
decision to cut prices was not a "punitive reaction." In testimony he stated he would "call it a defense of market position."" The court held that IBM's purpose in offering lower
34. See General Communication Eng'r, Inc. v. Motorola Communication and
Elecs., 421 F. Supp. 279, 285 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)).
35. Times Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1952).
36. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
37. Id. at 925-26.
38. 613 F.2d at 739-40 n.17.
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prices on its 2319A and 2319B products was to regain market
share and abate the competitive inroads achieved by peripheral manufacturers, who were "flourishing" under the company's "high price umbrella."" In addition, there was no evidence that the lower priced 2319A and 2319B were not
substantially profitable for IBM. The company anticipated
profits of twenty and thirty percent, respectively, before taxes,
40
on the two disc drive units at the lower prices.
The CalComp decision holds that IBM had the right, as a
dominant force in the market, to respond to the lower prices
of competitors by itself reducing prices, within the boundaries
of reasonable price competition, to a level substantially profitable for the company. The court characterized IBM's actions
as "a part of the very competitive process the Sherman Act
was designed to promote."' 41 The holding follows that enunciated by the same court in 1978 in ILC PeripheralsLeasing
Corp. v. IBM.42 It directly contradicts the 1977 holding in
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM" in which the court observed that one with monopoly power was not free to engage
in business practices of a kind an ordinary enterprise might
utilize with impunity. As a dominant force in the market,
IBM was precluded from employing any otherwise lawful
practice that unnecessarily excluded competition from the relevant market."
The United States Supreme Court has excepted from illegal monopolizing conduct, actions which increase market
share and lead to monopoly power over market price, when
accomplished by means of "a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 45 The exception was first elucidated in United States v.Aluminum Company of America "
where the Court stated that it was not the intent of the Sherman Act to condemn the results of superior skill, foresight,
and industry. The Court considered this superior competitor
"the passive beneficiary of a monopoly. 47 Recently, courts
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 739.
Id. at 740 n.19.
Id. at 742.
458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1977).
Id. at 498.

45. United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
46.
47.

148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 430.
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have taken a more activist view of the "thrust upon" monopolist. The Telex court dealt with the same issue and argued
that a manufacturer who sees its market share eroded by
others marketing copies of its product may use ordinary marketing practices to defend its market dominance. The court in
Telex held: "[W]e do not accept the requirement that. . the
'thrust upon' shorthand description means that the events or
acts must be entirely involuntary.'

8

Likewise, the CalComp

decision takes the position that since IBM's growth was a consequence of a superior product it was entitled to maintain this
position in the market through "business acumen," including
"shrewdness in profitable price competition."'

The court's

analysis may lead to widespread price competition by those
with monopoly power. Just how far the courts will go in permitting "shrewdness" is an open question.
CalComp does not represent the final word on the boundaries of "reasonable price competition." The Ninth Circuit has
since retreated from the test adopted in CalComp that "price
reductions up to the point of marginal cost are consistent with
competition on the merits"5 and that failure to show that defendant's prices are below marginal cost is a failure "as a matter of law."' 1 A district court case, In re IBM PeripheralEDP
Devices,' severely limited the marginal/average variable cost
rule. The court held pricing below "average cost" created an
inference of predation" and adopted the position that average
cost is the point below which all competitors incur a loss."
While this presents the most recent definition of "predatory
pricing," CalComp considerably advances the understanding
of "reasonable" conduct for a monopolist, and thus any domi48. 510 F.2d at 927.
49.
g0.
51.
52.
53.

613 F.2d at 742.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 742.
481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
Id. at 995.

54. Id. at 992. This limited the marginal cost rule to fact settings involving nonmonopolists charged with attempt to monopolize where no independent evidence of
specific intent and dangerous probability of success is admitted. Id. at 989. CalComp
was characterized as "limited to the facts of the case" and a "refinement" of the
standard. Id. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking, 386 U.S. 685, 698 (1967) (The

Supreme Court labelled defendant's price "below cost" for being "less than its direct
cost plus an allocation for overhead"). Other courts have adopted the marginal/average variable cost rule. 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 472 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Pa.
1979).
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nant competitor. Both cases express the current position on
section two monopolization and attempt to monopolize claims.
Plaintiff's prima facie case for "predatory pricing" has been
made easier. Any price below full average cost frustrates competition and is presumed "predatory." However, above this
threshold a monopolist is free to raise or lower prices and engage in "shrewdness in profitable price competition." A monopolist who has acquired its position by "superior product,
business acumen or historic accident" need no longer maintain a "passive" posture towards its competitors, but may engage in the same marketing techniques employed by other
competitors in the industry as long as it maintains a price
above "average cost." However, antitrust law, especially section one and section two violations, is still in a volatile period.
As the CalComp case indicates, the Ninth Circuit has changed
its direction on a number of issues and is still in a period of
change, unable to guarantee a sure footing to any party.
Manuel Fishman

ANTITRUST-MANUFACTURERS
ENGAGED IN A
DUAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ARE SINKING IN THE
UNCLEAR WATER OF PER SE ILLEGALITY-Guild
Wineries and Distilleries v. J. Sosnick & Son, 102 Cal. App.
3d 627, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1980).
Guild Wineries and Distiller is a wine marketing cooperative, controlled by its member grape growers. At the time,
Guild controlled approximately two percent of the Northern
California wine market. Fourteen wholesalers distributed
Guild's wines, each assigned to a sales area adjacent to the
wholesaler's headquarters. The territories were not exclusive
in practice; many of the distributors sold Guild products
outside their assigned territories due to overlapping customers' accounts.
In 1975, Guild terminated the wholesale distributorship
in the Fresno area. Because most of its growers were in
Fresno, Guild decided to increase its sales in this area by engaging in its own wholesaling under the name "Valley Distributors" (Valley Distributors was wholly owned and controlled
by Guild). The prior Fresno distributor's most lucrative account had been the Lucky Stores chain, whose central
purchasing operations were located in San Leandro (Alameda
County) and not in the Fresno area.
J. Sosnick, a wholesale food distributor who marketed
Guild wine in San Mateo County, also sold kosher foods to
Lucky. When the Fresno distributorship was terminated, Sosnick began to sell Guild wines to the Lucky chain. Guild
asked Sosnick to discontinue selling Guild wine to Lucky because Guild needed the lucrative Lucky account to offset the
expenses of operating its newly created "Valley Distributors."
Sosnick refused. Two weeks later, Guild terminated Sosnick's
wine distribution contract. Sosnick then failed to pay for wine
Guild had delivered, and Guild sued for monies due. Sosnick
cross-complained for alleged illegal imposition of territorial
restrictions.'
o 1981 by Theodore Robert Upland III.
1.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 1964) specifically prohibits the forma-

tion of a trust (i.e., a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons) for,
among others the following purposes: "To create or carry out restrictions in trade or
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At Guild's request the trial court gave instructions to the
jury directing them to hold Guild liable only if they found
that its termination of Sosnick's distributorship was the product of an agreement or conspiracy among competing independent wholesalers to divide the territory and customers between themselves.' The jury was precluded from finding
liability if Guild had acted alone, even if it had cancelled Sosnick for his refusal to yield the Lucky account to Guild.' Sosnick's proposed instructions, which the trial court declined to
give, were based on the theory that Guild's conduct would violate antitrust laws if it were carried out to enforce an illegal
customer allocation agreement. Judgment was entered from a
commerce .... To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation,
sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity."
2. The trial court gave Guild's instruction 37:
Under the facts of this case any restrictions and limitations on territories or on customers imposed by Guild on its distributors would not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws entitling Mr. Sosnick to recover
unless the acts were taken by Guild not as a producer or manufacturer
interested in the distribution of its product, but rather were taken to
enforce an agreement or conspiracy among the competing independent
wholesalers of its products to divide the territories and customers between themselves.
If you find that such an agreement existed, that is an agreement
between the independent wholesalers to divide the market and to allocate the customers and that Guild, in terminating Sosnick, knowingly
joined and acted as a party or acted in furtherance of that agreement,
then you must find in favor of Sosnick and against Guild on this issue.
102 Cal. App. 3d at 633 n.1, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.1.
3. The court also gave Guild's instruction 36:
1 instruct you that if Guild, provided it was acting alone and not pursuant to an unlawful conspiracy, asked Sosnick to cease dealing with
Lucky Stores because it wanted to service Lucky Stores and then terminated Sosnick because he refused, an antitrust violation could not be
established for that termination.
Id. at 633 n.1, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.2.
4. Sosnick's proposed instructions 17 and 19 stated:
A seller of goods has a legal right to announce to his customers that he
has established a policy prohibiting such customers from reselling the
goods to a specified person or persons, and to refuse to deal with any
customer who does not follow the policy. But it is illegal for the seller to
take affirmative action, such as threatening to stop selling to his customer, to enforce his policy. Furthermore, the law imposes two important limitations on this right:
First, if a seller announces to his customer a policy which-if accepted by the customer-would result in an illegal horizontal customer
allocation agreement, it is illegal for the seller to go beyond a mere announcement of the policy and use other means-such as threats of terminations if the customer refuses to comply-which effect adherence to
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jury verdict in favor of Guild. Sosnick appealed on grounds of
prejudicial jury instructions.
Because California's Cartwright Act" is patterned after
the federal Sherman Antitrust Act,6 "federal cases interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable with respect to the Cartwright Act."' The court of appeal, therefore, looked to federal
authority in deciding whether there was a violation of antitrust laws that would warrant Sosnick's proposed jury instructions. Under the court's analysis, the crucial issue was
whether Guild's conduct imposed either vertical territorial
restrictions8 on Sosnick judged under the "rule of reason" 9 or
a horizontal restraint of trade10 governed by the per se
the policy.
Second, it is illegal for the seller to refuse to deal with a customer, if
the refusal is made pursuant to an illegal combination or conspiracy (Instruction 17).
If a supplier (such as Guild) having an ongoing business relationship with a distributor (such as Sosnick) requests the distributor to
enter into an agreement which would violate the Cartwright Act; if the
distributor refuses to enter into the proposed illegal agreement; if the
supplier exerts pressure upon the distributor to accept the illegal agreement; and if the supplier terminates the distributor because of the distributor's refusal to accept, then the termination itself is in violation of
the Cartwright Act (Instruction 19).
Id. at 633 n.3, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.3.
5. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16750 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
7. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 306,
70 Cal. Rptr. 849, 855, 444 P.2d 481, 487 (1968).
8. "Vertical territorial restrictions" are non-price restraints which a manufacturer imposes upon a non-integrated distributor in limiting the latter's resale territory or customers.
9. Under the "rule of reason" standard, the fact-finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
10. Horizontal restraints are agreements among firms, usually at the same stage
of production. Thus, agreements among manufacturers, among wholesalers, or among
retailers are horizontal.
In Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. PEPI, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 685, 687
(W.D. Pa. 1977), the court again defined vertical and horizontal restraints:
Vertical restraints may be understood as those imposed by agreement
between a manufacturer and a distributor or dealer, where the parties
occupy a different rank in the hierarchy of distribution. Horizontal restrictions may be understood as those imposed by agreement between
parties of the same rank or level in the system of distribution.
In Oreck v. Whirlpool, 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978), the court distinguished the two
restrictions:
Horizontal restraints alone have been characterized as "naked restraints
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doctrine.11
Federal judicial development in the non-price, territorial
restriction facet of antitrust law has followed an unclear path.
In Standard Oil v. United States12 the United States Supreme Court declared the "rule of reason" to be the governing
standard thereby limiting violations under section 1 of the
Sherman Act to those covenants which unreasonably restrained trade. Because litigation following this holding
proved to be extremely complex and lengthy, courts after
Standard Oil applied the "per se illegality" doctrine to resolve disputes involving restraint of trade.' s The per se doctrine was not considered a departure from the "rule of reason"
rather a refinement of that doctrine.14
Fifty-two years after the Standard Oil decision, the Supreme Court followed the per se doctrine to hold that "horizontal" covenants allocating territories within which competitors may operate are "tantamount to agreements not to
compete, and hence inevitably violative of the Sherman
Act.

5

Ten years later, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn

& Co., the Court first held "vertical" territorial restrictions to
be per se illegal when coupled with price fixing.' 6
of trade with no purpose except stifling competition," and, therefore per
se violations of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, while vertical restrictions may reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of
sellers of a particular product, competing for a given group of buyers,
they also promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer
to achieve certain efficiencies of distribution of its products. They are,
therefore, to be examined under the rule of reason.
Id. at 131 (emphasis original)(citations omitted).
11. "Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct
that is manifestly anticompetitive." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977). The Court in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1 (1958) set forth this concept:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Id. at 5.
12. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
13. See, e.g., Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1940); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1939); United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
14. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor
and its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1968).
15. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1963).
16. 388 U.S. 365, 366 (1967).
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The per se holding of Schwinn was reversed a decade
later in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.17 The
Sylvania Court, in overruling Schwinn, announced that a
"rule of reason" standard should apply to vertical restrictions
since they promote economic efficiency. 18 Justice Powell, writing the majority opinion, explained that vertical restrictions
can "promote inter-brand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of
his products"' 1 and declared that inter-brand competition"0
rather than intra-brand competition, 2 ' "is the primary concern of antitrust law."' 2 However, in stressing the Sherman

Act's focus on inter-brand competition, the Sylvania Court
did not go so far as to condone "horizontal" intra-brand
restraints.
The majority in Guild implicitly utilized the per se principles (horizontal restraints of trade) outlined in Schwinn and
reversed the trial court on grounds that the jury instructions
were inconsistent with the per se doctrine. Had the Sylvania
and Standard Oil "rule of reason" approach to vertical restraints of trade been applied, the trial court's instructions
would have been either correct or harmless error. The evidence presented would not have supported antitrust liability
under this latter theory.
Guild Wineries was originally involved in an exclusively
17. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
18. Id. at 54-58. Economic analysis has substantiated Justice Powell's majority
opinion: Vertical territorial restrictions can create inter-brand competition through
distribution efficiencies without resulting in monopoly losses. See Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J.

537 (1975); Kellman, Vertical TerritorialRestrictionsand the Limits of Planning,46
ANTrrUST L.J. 1107 (1978); Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws,
41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506 (1974). But these distribution efficiencies are only accomplished at the expense of preventing distributors from competing with one another
for the same customers, thus mitigating intra-brand competition. Kellman, supra, at
1118-19; Comanor, supra, note 14, at 1422.
19. 433 U.S. at 54.
20. Inter-brand competition involves the market share of one type of product.
Each manufacturer introduces his own respective brand of the particular type of
product and all manufacturers compete against each other in trying to capture a
larger share of that product's market.
21. Intra-brand competition involves the demand for one particular brand of a
product. The distributors then compete among themselves for the retail market share
of that particular brand, e.g., Guild wines. This is opposed to the competition among
inter-brand manufacturers, e.g., the California wine market.
22. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
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vertical relationship with each of its independent distributors.
After creating its own "Valley Distributors", Guild also became involved in a horizontal relationship with the independent distributors. When a manufacturer also distributes its
own products, (dual distribution), there is a departure from
conventional vertical and horizontal relationships. The manufacturer, in imposing both vertical and horizontal restraints,
affects its own distributorship market as well as those of the
independent distributors of its products. The manufacturer's
vertical goal of efficiency of distribution is in competition with
the distributors' horizontal goal of maximizing the number of
goods sold in each respective territory.
The Guild court concluded that the vertical relationship
Guild had with its independent wine distributors was severed
when Guild itself became a distributor. It considered Guild's
subsequent territorial restrictions to be coercion of a fellow
distributor (Sosnick) into allocating customers. The court
then said this coercion was, in effect, an agreement to divide
territories among the distributors (a "horizontal" restraint of
trade) and- thus a per se violation of the Cartwright Act.
The Guild majority relied on American Motor Inns, Inc.
v. Holiday Inns, Inc., s a dual distribution fact situation in
which Holiday Inns was operating as franchisor of its trademark and as an operator of inns. In Holiday Inns, the court
found that restraints in the Holiday Inn franchise agreements,
which prohibited franchisees from establishing competing
Holiday Inns or noncompeting Holiday Inns in cities where
Holiday Inns, Inc. operated as an establishment, constituted a
market allocation agreement among competitors and was per
se illegal.
The majority opinion in Guild also referred to a recent
application of the per se principle to a dual distribution system in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. (BRICCO),
where BRICCO was integrated in both the manufacturing and
supply of Baskin-Robbins ice cream products through its subsidiary Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream, Inc. In Krehl, the court
held that the franchisor (BRICCO) was "[a]n entity occupying
such a dual role [and] is forbidden per se from imposing terri23.
24.

521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
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torial market restrictions.

25

The Guild majority, in relying on Holiday Inns, Krehl,
and others, 26 clearly distinguished the dual distribution system as an exercise in horizontal restraint of trade. Yet the
court said that labeling a restraint "vertical" or "horizontal"
to resolve disputes involving a dual distribution system deteriorates into "formalistic line drawing, 27 and declared the primary consideration to be whether the conduct produces only
28
anticompetitive effects without "countervailing benefits.
Guild argued that economic efficiencies necessitated the
decision to terminate Sosnick; the action was taken in order to
afford Valley Distributors the exclusive selling rights to the
Lucky chain. However, the majority concluded that the
"countervailing benefits" of promoting Guild's inter-brand
competition in the California wine market through economic
efficiencies were not substantial enough to disregard the anticompetitive effects of these territorial restrictions on intrabrand competition among Guild's distributors. The majority
then applied the per se principle to these particular restrictions and concluded that Guild's conduct had no clearly discernible benefits to competition; it was therefore per se illegal.
Justice Christian, in dissent, recognized the difficulty of
analyzing the dual distribution system when attempts are
made to distinguish restrictions (or restraints) solely as horizontal or vertical. Justice Christian, like the majority, reiterated Sylvania's condemnation of "formalistic line drawing,"
and utilized this theme to summarily dispose of any attempt
to "pigeonhole" restrictive conduct into such categories.
The dissent limited the per se doctrine only to those situations which involve clearly horizontal restraints originating
in agreements among retailers. When the challenged restrictions are not exclusively horizontal, and no evidence exists to
indicate an agreement originating among the retailers, then
per se principles would be inapplicable. In following the Sylvania Court's holding that adverse effects on non-price distribution restrictions on intra-brand competition are outweighed
25. Id. at 123.
26. See Hobart Brothers Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
27. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 635, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 92 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59).
28. Id.
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by the potential for beneficial effects on inter-brand competition, the dissent concluded that the "rule of reason" must be
applicable in determining the illegality of Guild's conduct.2 9
The dissent in Guild thus completed the majority's disguised economic analysis of the anticompetitive effects of
Guild's attempted restrictions on Sosnick. It stated that the
probability and severity of anticompetitive consequences resulting from a particular practice must be balanced against
the procompetitive consequences of such conduct. This can
only be accomplished when the conduct is judged under the
"rule of reason."
The Guild majority, by declaring the restraint to be per
se illegal without balancing the competitive effects, has imposed a twofold choice on manufacturers: 1) to deal exclusively outside the dual distribution system (when considering
economies of distribution) in order to avoid antitrust litigation; or, 2) to accede to "free rides"30 and an inefficient or discretionary supply of promotional services (for the manufacturers' product) by the distributors.
Sylvania initiated considerations of economic efficiency.
In a situation such as Guild, where the manufacturer owns a
mere two percent of the market, economic efficiency would necessitate territorial restrictions on the distributors. Because
there was no conspiracy among Valley and the independent
distributors, restraint of competition did not appear to be
Guild's primary motive. Instead, Guild wished to curtail intrabrand competition to increase its own share of the extensive
California wine market and, in effect, promote inter-brand
competition.
Since "per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when
they relate to conduct that is manifestly anti-competitive," 1
Sylvania would seem to require a consideration of Guild's economic necessity for terminating Sosnick. Justice Christian's
strong dissent supports this demand for inquiry when he
29. Id. at 646 (Christian J., dissenting).
30. Overlapping accounts are created when the distributor sells more than just
the manufacturer's product. In this situation the distributor may have accounts for
other types of goods outside their manufacturer-assigned territory and, in the process
of distributing those other goods, they sell the manufacturer's product to the customer. The distributor thus obtains a "free ride" into another manufacturer-assigned
territory by realizing revenue from these accounts without expending cost for
promotion.
31. 433 U.S. at 49-50.
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states that the restrictions should be reviewed under the
Sylvania "rule of reason" approach. 2
The restrictions involved in Guild are not "purely" horizontal, did not originate from the distributor's hierarchical
level, and did not force Sosnick to lose any pre-restraint
customer accounts. The majority in Guild should have interpreted Guild's actions as intra-brand restraint caused by economic necessity and business judgment and, therefore, applied the more appropriate and prevailing "rule of reason"
standard.
Theodore Robert Upland III

32.

102 Cal.App.3d at 646 (Christian, J., dissenting).

WORKERS' COMPENSATION-EMPLOYEE MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION AT LAW AGAINST EMPLOYER FOR
AGGRAVATION OF INDUSTRIAL DISEASE CAUSED BY
EMPLOYER'S FRAUDULENT CONDUCT--Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612
P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
In 1946, the Johns-Manville Products Corporation, a
manufacturer of asbestos, hired Reba Rudkin to work at its
Pittsburg, California plant.' The company had known since
1924 that prolonged exposure to or ingestion of asbestos posed
health dangers, but advised Rudkin that working with asbestos was safe.' Rudkin himself, ignorant of any risk, remained
employed with Johns-Manville for twenty-nine years. During
that time and due to continuous exposure to asbestos at the
plant, Rudkin developed pulmonary disease.8
Johns-Manville retained doctors to examine Rudkin, but
failed to inform these doctors of the danger of exposure to
asbestos, of the development of Rudkin's pulmonary disease,
or of the disease's relationship to Rudkin's extensive contact
with asbestos on the job. The company further concealed the
fact that Rudkin's illness was work-related by failing to file a
First Report of Occupational Injury or Illness with the State
of California as required by law.4
To recover for his disability, Rudkin filed a complaint
against his employer seeking compensatory and punitive damages.8 The complaint alleged that Johns-Manville fraudulently
induced Rudkin to continue employment that he would have
terminated had he known that his illness had been caused by
working conditions at the plant. Johns-Manville contended
that the action was barred by California Labor Code section
3601,' which provides that workers' compensation benefits are
© 1981 by Julie Saake.
1. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 469, 612
P.2d 948, 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 860 (1980).
2. Id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 470, 612 P.2d at 951, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1980) provides in part: "Where the
conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation ... is...
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the exclusive remedy of an employee injured while acting
within the scope of his employment. The company then
moved for judgment on the pleadings, which motion was
denied.
Johns-Manville then petitioned the California Supreme
Court for a writ of mandate to set aside the trial court's order.
Justice Mosk, joined by Chief Justice Bird and Justices Tobriner, Manuel and Newman, concluded that the writ should
be denied.7 The court held that although the workers' compensation law bars an employee action at law for initial injury,
a cause of action may exist for an aggravation of that injury
caused by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the condition and its cause.8
The court found the dispute in this case centered upon
whether California Labor Code section 4553,9 which awards a
one-half increase in compensation benefits to the employee injured by the employer's serious and willful misconduct, was
intended by the Legislature to cover the intentional acts of
employers that cause employee injury. If section 4553 applied
to the misconduct of Johns-Manville, then that increase in
compensation benefits would be Rudkin's exclusive remedy,
and an action at law would be barred.
The court first determined that section 4553 was intended by the Legislature to replace a common law right of
action.10 Citing Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission," the court further found that the "serious and
willful misconduct" in section 4553 was identical to the "intentional misconduct" alleged in Rudkin's complaint."' Acthe exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or
against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his
employment."
7. 27 Cal. 3d at 478-79, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. After the petition

was filed Rudkin died of lung cancer. The court proceeded to determine the issue,
noting that by virtue of California Probate Code § 573 an action for personal injuries
survives the death of the plaintiff. Id. at 470, 612 P.2d at 951, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
8. Id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
9.

CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1980) reads in part: "The amount of

compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half where the employee is
injured by the serious and wilful misconduct of.. .the employer, or ...[i]f the
employer is a corporation, on the part of an executive, managing officer, or general
superintendent thereof."
10. 27 Cal. 3d at 472, 612 P.2d at 952, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
11. 40 Cal. 2d 102, 251 P.2d 955 (1953).
12. 27 Cal. 3d at 472-73, 612 P.2d at 952-53, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
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cordingly section 4553 was applicable to the conduct of JohnsManville, and would thus constitute Rudkin's exclusive remedy regardless of whether that conduct was classified as "serious and willful" or "intentional" misconduct.
The court then found that an employee's allegation of
fraudulent conduct by the employer could not form the sole
basis of an action at law for damages. s The primary reason
such suits could not be maintained was that the workers' compensation system would be undermined." This was true even
when grounds for the suit were not clearly traceable to the
employment relationship. The court feared that "[t]he focus
of the inquiry in a case involving work-related injury would
often be not whether the injury arose out of and in the course
of employment, but the knowledge of the employer and the
employee regarding the dangerous condition which caused the
injury." 15
The court went on to hold that in certain exceptional
circumstances the employer would not escape liability at law
for intentional acts, even though workers' compensation
covered the resultant employee injury.' Although case law
was by no means consistent, the court noted a common
thread. In cases holding employers liable at common law, the
employer's intentional misconduct had exceeded a failure to
assure that the tools or materials used by the employee and
the physical environment of the workplace were safe. 17 Liability in an action at law was imposed for the misconduct which
included physical assault,' 8 aggravation of a prior work-re13. The court at this point relied on the cases of Buttner v. American Bell Telephone Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 581, 107 P.2d 439 (1940), and Wright v. FMC, 81 Cal.
App. 3d 777, 146 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1978). In Buttner, the employer suggested to the
employee that certain dangerous chemicals used on the job were harmless. The injured employee's action at law for deceit was barred by the exclusive remedy in workers' compensation, the court finding that such benefits covered all injuries incurred in
the course of employment, irrespective of the manner in which they might occur. In
Wright a similar employee action was barred. The complaint had alleged fraud by the
employer in concealing the risks involved in handling work materials.
14. 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 473, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
17. Id. at 475, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
18. Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
A waitress who had been assaulted by her employer was permitted to maintain an
action at law, even though an application for workers' compensation benefits had also
been filed. The court observed that under workers' compensation law an employee
assaulted by a co-worker could recover damages at law as well as compensation bene-
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lated injury,19 and fraudulent deprivation of a third party
suit."0 In such cases, the interest of society in deterring similar
conduct was so great as to justify the imposition of punitive
damages on the employer, and that penalty was available only
in an action at law. 1
In allowing Rudkin's action, the court perceived a trend
toward permitting actions at law "if the employer acts deliberately for the purpose of injuring the employee or if the harm
resulting from the intentional misconduct consists of aggravation of an initial work-related injury.' 2 The court, however,
limited its holding to the latter situation. Only in those instances where suit was brought for aggravation of an existing
work-related injury could an action at law be maintained. The
court felt that such a narrow holding would prevent the opening of a "Pandora's box" of actions at law seeking recovery for
industrial diseases." The court believed that the exclusive
remedy in workers' compensation would not be seriously undermined since most employers would not "aggravate the effects of an industrial injury by not only deliberately concealing its existence but also its connection with the
employment. ' " Finally, the court found that double recovery
by the employee could be avoided by allowing the employer a
set-off in the event the plaintiff is awarded damages in his
action at law.2
fits. An employee assaulted by the employer had no such right. The court found this
result to be inequitable; when an employer inflicts an intentional injury upon the
employee, the courts are free to determine whether the employer loses his immunity
from civil suit.
19. Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 815 (1972). An employee was permitted to maintain an action at law against her
employer's workers' compensation insurer for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the insurer's investigation of her claim.
The court noted that under California Labor Code section 3757 the insurer had
"stepped into the shoes of the employer" for the purpose of bringing the claim to a
final resolution. The court proceeded to hold that immunity from common law liability was lost when the insurer acted deceitfully in the course of the claim investigation.
20. Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp., 173 Cal. App. 2d 386, 343 P.2d 787
(1959). The employer made misrepresentations and concealed the fact that the employee's injuries were caused by a third party against whom he had recourse. The
court found the employee's cause of action to stem, not from the sustaining of the
original injury, but from an occurrence that derived from that injury.
21. 27 Cal. 3d at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
22. Id. at 476, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
23. Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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In cases alleging an intentional tort on the part of an employer, there has been particular pressure to circumvent the
exclusive remedy rule of California Labor Code sections 3601
and 4553.2' That punitive damages, as such, are unavailable
under the workers' compensation law is one reason for this
pressure.2 Fairness is also a factor. An employee may expect
workers' compensation to constitute the exclusive remedy for
ordinary work-related injuries. It is less clear, however, that in
accepting a job the employee would contemplate bargaining
away his right to obtain a remedy at law in the event that his
employer commits an intentional tort against him." The
court, in arriving at its decision to allow Rudkin's suit, took
into account these considerations. It also afforded great
weight to the policy of preserving intact the workers' compensation system.29
As a matter of theory, this decision provides the best
means of balancing these competing considerations. The decision allowed the court to resolve fairly the issue before it,
while impinging as little as possible upon the territory of
workers' compensation.
The court found Johns-Manville's misconduct to be particularly egregious. They refused to believe that "the Legislature in enacting the workers' compensation law intended to
insulate such flagrant conduct from tort liability."8 0 In the future, courts may find other flagrant employer acts that will
not be afforded the insulation of workers' compensation.
As a practical matter, by allowing common law damage
awards for the aggravation of a prior work-related injury,
courts will be faced with a perplexing allocation problem. As
workers' compensation benefits are still the exclusive remedy
for an initial injury, an apportionment of the employee's disability between that injury and its subsequent aggravation will
have to be made. That apportionment is certain to prove vexatious in cases where the employee alleges a cumulative
26. Employer Liability for Intentional Torts, 8 CAL. WORKERS' Comp. REP. 47
(1980).

27. As the court noted, the one-half increase in compensation benefits to the
employee, as provided by § 4553, does not constitute exemplary damages. 27 Cal. 3d

at 478 n.12, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. In any event, such additional
compensation is limited to $10,000. CAL. LAB. CoDE § 4553 (West Supp. 1980).

28.

27 Cal. 3d at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.

29.

Id. at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.

30. Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.

548

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

trauma type injury. 1 When an injury does not manifest itself
for several years it may be impossible to make the necessary
distinction. In addition, through skillful pleading employees
alleging cumulative trauma may be able to maintain civil
suits. The determining factor in such suits may be the knowledge of the employer and the employee with respect to the
dangerous condition which caused the injury, a situation the
court wished to avoid by ruling as it did. 82
Justice Clark, joined by Justice Richardson, dissented
fearing that the effect of the majority opinion would be a reduction in the number of employer-furnished medical programs designed to minimize industrial injury and disease; employers may try to remain ignorant of their employees' health
problems in an effort to escape tort liability.8 8 They further
noted that any injury incurred by an employee as a result of a
medical program provided by the employer was compensable
under workers' compensation, and that Rudkin had not
brought himself within any statutory exception. 4
The dissent, however, overlooked the fact that Rudkin
was not directly injured by the medical program. Rather, that
program was used by the employer as a vehicle to perpetrate
its own fraud. The treatment rendered under the program was
inadequate because Johns-Manville did not provide the physicians with sufficient information regarding the risks of asbestos exposure. Thus, the court's decision should have no significant effect on bona fide employer-furnished medical
programs. Employers who act in good faith to try to minimize
the occurrence of industrial disease need not fear that they
will be held liable for damages in an action at law.
The court's holding, that an action at law may be maintained by an employee whose industrial disease is aggravated
by the employer's fraudulent conduct, resolved the case at
hand. Remaining unanswered, however, is the nebulous question of whether an employer who inflicts an initial injury may
31. "Cumulative trauma refers to the gradual onset of damage to some part of
the body caused by repeated activities, either successive injuries to the same part of

the body, or normal activities which alone are insufficient to cause disability but
whose cumulative effect results in a condition causing disability." 1 S. HERLICK, CALIFORNIA WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW HANDBOOK 364 (2d ed. 1978).
32. 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.

33. Id. at 480, 612 P.2d at 957, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
34.

Id. at 482-84, 612 P.2d 959-60, 165 Cal. Rptr. 868-70.
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also be held at law.85 The court neatly side stepped that issue
by making a distinction between initial injury and subsequent
aggravation.
The court did, however, provide some guidance toward
the resolution of future cases. The exclusive remedy rule will
continue to apply to employee injuries incurred in the course
of employment. In exceptional cases where the public policy
of deterring flagrant employer conduct is strong, and the total
effect on the workers' compensation system is minimal, it can
be expected that the courts will allow an employee action at
law to be maintained.
Julie Saake

35. Two court of appeal decisions, Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70
Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968), and Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 621 (1975), involve employees seeking to recover at law for initial injuries. Although the cases involved almost identical facts, they were resolved differently.
Azevedo held that § 4553 barred an action at law, while the court in Magliulo permitted the civil suit. The supreme court explicitly stated that the initial injury issue was
not presented in the case and was not resolved by the decision. 27 Cal. 3d at 477 n.11,
612 P.2d at 956 n.11, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865 n.11.

